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Abstract
The logic of knowledge and justified assumptions, also
known as the logic of grounded knowledge (GK), was pro-
posed by Lin and Shoham as a general logic for nonmono-
tonic reasoning. To date, it has been used to embed in it de-
fault logic (propositional case), autoepistemic logic, Turner’s
logic of universal causation, and general logic programming
under stable model semantics. Besides showing the general-
ity of GK as a logic for nonmonotonic reasoning, these em-
beddings shed light on the relationships among these other
logics. In this paper, for the first time, we show how the
logic of GK can be embedded into disjunctive logic program-
ming in a polynomial but non-modular translation with new
variables. The result can then be used to compute the ex-
tension/expansion semantics of default logic, autoepistemic
logic and Turner’s logic of universal causation by disjunctive
ASP solvers such as GNT, cmodels, DLV, and claspD(-2).
Introduction
Lin and Shoham [1992] proposed a logic with two modal op-
erators K and A, standing for knowledge and assumption,
respectively. The idea is that one starts with a set of assump-
tions (those true under the modal operatorA), computes the
minimal knowledge under this set of assumptions, and then
checks to see if the assumptions were justified in that they
agree with the resulting minimal knowledge. For instance,
consider the GK formula Ap ⊃ Kp. If we assume p, then
we can conclude that we know p, thus the assumption that
p holds is justified, and we get a GK model where both Ap
and Kp are true. (There is another GK model where we do
not assume p and hence do not know p.) However, there is
no GK model of ¬Ap ⊃ Kp: if we do not assume p, we are
forced to concludeKp, but then knowledge and assumptions
do not coincide; if we do assume p, we cannot conclude that
we know p and thus assuming p was not justified.
To date, there have been embeddings from default
logic [Reiter, 1980] and autoepistemic logic [Moore, 1985]
to the logic of GK [Lin and Shoham, 1992], from Turner’s
logic of universal causation [Turner, 1999] to the logic
of GK [Ji and Lin, 2012], as well as from general logic
programs [Ferraris, 2005] to the logic of GK [Lin and
Zhou, 2011]. Among other things, these embeddings
shed new light on nonmonotonic reasoning, and have led
to an interesting characterization of strong equivalence in
logic programming [Lin, 2002; Lin and Zhou, 2011], and
helped relate logic programming to circumscription [Lin and
Shoham, 1992] as the semantics of GK is just a minimization
(of knowledge) together with an identity check (of assump-
tions and knowledge) after the minimization.
In this paper, for the first time, we consider computing
models of GK theories by disjunctive logic programs. We
shall propose a polynomial translation from a (pure) GK
theory to a disjunctive logic program such that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between GK models of the GK
theory and answer sets of the resulting disjunctive logic
program. The result can then be used to compute the ex-
tension/expansion semantics of default logic, autoepistemic
logic and Turner’s logic of universal causation by disjunc-
tive ASP solvers such as GNT [Janhunen and Niemela¨,
2004], cmodels [Giunchiglia, Lierler, and Maratea, 2006],
DLV [Leone et al., 2006], claspD [Drescher et al., 2008] and
claspD-2 [Gebser, Kaufmann, and Schaub, 2013]. In par-
ticular, the recent advances in disjunctive answer set solv-
ing [Gebser, Kaufmann, and Schaub, 2013] open up promis-
ing research avenues towards applications of expressive non-
monotonic knowledge representation languages.
To substantiate this claim, we have implemented the
translation and report on some preliminary experiments that
we conducted on the special case of computing extensions
for Reiter’s default logic [Reiter, 1980]. The implementa-
tion, called gk2dlp, is available for download from the sec-
ond author’s home page.1
Providing implementations for theoretical formalisms has
a long tradition in nonmonotonic reasoning, for an overview
see [Dix, Furbach, and Niemela¨, 2001]. In fact, nonmono-
tonic reasoning itself originated from a desire to more ac-
curately model the way humans reason, and was since its
conception driven by applications in commonsense reason-
ing [McCarthy, 1980, 1986]. Today, thanks to extensive re-
search efforts, we know how closely interrelated the differ-
ent formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning are, and can use
this knowledge to improve the scope of implementations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
logic programs, the logic of GK and default and autoepis-
temic logics. Section 3 presents our main result, the map-
1http://informatik.uni-leipzig.de/˜strass/
gk2dlp/
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ping from GK to disjunctive logic programming. Section
4 presents our prototypical implementation, several experi-
ments we conducted to analyze the translation, possible ap-
plications for it, and a comparison with previous and related
work. Section 5 concludes with ideas for future work.
Preliminaries
We assume a propositional language with two zero-place
logical connectives > for tautology and ⊥ for contradiction.
We denote by Atom the set of atoms, the signature of our
language, and Lit the set of literals: Lit = Atom ∪ {¬p |
p ∈ Atom}. A set I of literals is called complete if for each
atom p, exactly one of {p,¬p} is in I .
In this paper, we identify an interpretation with a complete
set of literals. If I is a complete set of literals, we use it as
an interpretation when we say that it is a model of a formula,
and we use it as a set of literals when we say that it entails
a formula. In particular, we denote by Th(I) the logical
closure of I (considered to be a set of literals).
Logic Programming
A nested expression is built from literals using the 0-place
connectives > and ⊥, the unary connective “not” and the
binary connectives “,” and “;” for conjunction and disjunc-
tion. A logic program with nested expressions is a finite set
of rules of the form F ← G, where F and G are nested ex-
pressions. The answer set of a logic program with nested
expressions is defined as in [Lifschitz, Tang, and Turner,
1999]. Given a nested expression F and a set S of liter-
als, we define when S satisfies F , written S |= F below,
recursively as follows (l is a literal):
• S |= l if l ∈ S,
• S |= > and S 6|= ⊥,
• S |= not F if S 6|= F ,
• S |= F,G if S |= F and S |= G, and
• S |= F ;G if S |= F or S |= G.
S satisfies a rule F ← G if S |= F whenever S |= G. S
satisfies a logic program P , written S |= P , if S satisfies all
rules in P .
The reduct PS of P related to S is the result of replacing
every maximal subexpression of P that has the form not F
with ⊥ if S |= F , and with > otherwise. For a logic pro-
gram P without not, the answer set of P is any minimal
consistent subset S of Lit that satisfies P . We use ΓP (S) to
denote the set of answer sets of PS . Now a consistent set S
of literals is an answer set of P iff S ∈ ΓP (S). Every logic
program with nested expressions can be equivalently trans-
lated to disjunctive logic programs with disjunctive rules of
the form
l1; · · · ; lk ←lk+1, . . . , lt, not lt+1, . . . , not lm,
not not lm+1, . . . , not not ln
where n ≥ m ≥ t ≥ k ≥ 0 and l1, . . . , ln are propositional
literals.
Default Logic
Default logic [Reiter, 1980] is for making and withdrawing
assumptions in the light of incomplete knowledge. This is
done by defaults, that allow to express rules of thumb such
as “birds usually fly” and “tools usually work.” For a given
logical language, a default is any expression of the form
φ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ϕ where φ, ψ1, . . . , ψn, ϕ are formulas of
the underlying language. A default theory is a pair (W,D),
where W is a set of formulas and D is a set of defaults. The
meaning of default theories is given through the notion of
extensions. An extension of a default theory (W,D) is “in-
terpreted as an acceptable set of beliefs that one may hold
about the incompletely specified world W ” [Reiter, 1980].
For a default theory (W,D) and any set S of formulas let
Γ(S) be the smallest set satisfying (1) W ⊆ Γ(S), (2)
Th(Γ(S)) = Γ(S), (3) If φ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ϕ ∈ D, φ ∈ Γ(S)
and ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn /∈ S, then ϕ ∈ Γ(S). A set E of formu-
las is called an extension for (W,D) iff Γ(E) = E.
Autoepistemic Logic
Moore [1985] strives to formalize an ideally rational agent
reasoning about its own beliefs. He uses a belief modality L
to explicitly refer to the agent’s belief within the language.
Given a set A of formulas (the initial beliefs), a set T is an
expansion of A if it coincides with the deductive closure of
the set A ∪ {Lϕ | ϕ ∈ T} ∪ {¬Lϕ | ϕ /∈ T}. In words, T
is an expansion if it equals what can be derived using the
initial beliefs A and positive and negative introspection with
respect to T itself. It was later discovered that this defini-
tion of expansions allows unfounded, self-justifying beliefs.
Such beliefs are however not always desirable when repre-
senting the knowledge of agents.
The Logic of GK
The language of GK proposed by Lin and Shoham [1992] is
a modal propositional language with two modal operators,
K, for knowledge, and A, for assumption. GK formulas ϕ
are propositional formulas withK andA, that is,
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kϕ | Aϕ
where p is an atom. A GK theory is a set of GK formulas.
GK is a nonmonotonic logic, and its semantics is defined
using the standard Kripke possible world interpretations. In-
formally speaking, a GK model is a Kripke interpretation
where what is true underK is minimal and exactly the same
as what is true under A. The intuition here is that given a
GK formula, one first makes some assumptions (those true
under A), then one minimizes the knowledge thus entailed,
and finally checks to make sure that the initial assumption is
justified in the sense that the minimal knowledge is the same
as the initial assumption.
Formally, a Kripke interpretation M is a tuple
〈W,pi,RK , RA, s〉, where W is a nonempty set of possi-
ble worlds, pi a function that maps a possible world to an
interpretation, RK and RA binary relations over W rep-
resenting the accessibility relations for K and A, respec-
tively, and s ∈W , called the actual world of M . The
satisfaction relation |= between a Kripke interpretation
M = 〈W,pi,RK , RA, s〉 and a GK formula ϕ is defined in a
standard way:
• M 6|= ⊥,
• M |= p iff p ∈ pi(s), where p is an atom,
• M |= ¬ϕ iff M 6|= ϕ,
• M |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M |= ϕ and M |= ψ,
• M |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M |= ϕ or M |= ψ,
• M |= Kϕ iff 〈W,pi,RK , RA, w〉 |= ϕ for any w ∈ W
such that (s, w) ∈ RK ,
• M |= Aϕ iff 〈W,pi,RK , RA, w〉 |= ϕ for any w ∈ W
such that (s, w) ∈ RA.
Note that for any w ∈W , pi(w) is an interpretation. We say
that a Kripke interpretationM is a model of a GK formula ϕ
if M satisfies ϕ, M is a model of a GK theory T if M satis-
fies every GK formula in T . In the following, given a Kripke
interpretation M , we let
K(M) = {φ | φ is a propositional formula and M |= Kφ },
A(M) = {φ | φ is a propositional formula and M |= Aφ }.
Notice thatK(M) andA(M) are always closed under clas-
sical logical entailment – they are propositional theories.
Given a GK formula T , a Kripke interpretation M is a
minimal model of T ifM is a model of T and there does not
exist another model M1 of T such that A(M1) = A(M)
and K(M1) ( K(M). We say that M is a GK model of T
if M is a minimal model of T andK(M) = A(M).
In this paper, we consider only GK formulas that do not
contain nested occurrences of modal operators. Specifically,
an A-atom is a formula of the form Aφ and a K-atom is
a formula of the form Kφ, where φ is a propositional for-
mula. A GK formula is called a pure GK formula if it is
formed from A-atoms, K-atoms and propositional connec-
tives. Similarly, a pure GK theory is a set of pure GK for-
mulas. Given a pure GK formula F , we denote
AtomK(F ) = {φ | Kφ is aK-atom occurring in F },
AtomA(F ) = {φ | Aφ is anA-atom occurring in F }.
For a pure GK theory T , we use AtomK(T ) =⋃
F∈T AtomK(F ) and AtomA(T ) =
⋃
F∈T AtomA(F )
to denote their modal atoms.
So far, the applications of the logic of GK only ever use
pure GK formulas. We now present some embeddings of
well-known nonmonotonic knowledge representation lan-
guages into the logic of GK.
Default logic A (propositional) default theory ∆ =
(W,D) (under extension semantics) is translated into pure
GK formulas in the following way: (1) Translate each φ ∈
W to Kφ; (2) translate each (φ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ϕ) ∈ D to
Kφ ∧ ¬A¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬A¬ψn ⊃ Kϕ. For the weak exten-
sion semantics, a default (φ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ϕ) ∈ D is trans-
lated toAφ ∧ ¬A¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬A¬ψn ⊃ Kϕ.
Autoepistemic logic An L-sentence of autoepistemic
logic that is in normal form [Konolige, 1988], that is, a
disjunction of the form ¬Lφ ∨ Lψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Lψn ∨ ϕ,
is (under expansion semantics) expressed as
Aφ ∧ ¬Aψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Aψn ⊃ Kϕ. For strong expansion
semantics, it becomesKφ ∧ ¬Aψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Aψn ⊃ Kϕ.
Notice that the translation of default and autoepistemic
theories into the logic of GK is compatible with Kono-
lige’s translation from default logic into autoepistemic
logic [Konolige, 1988]. Indeed, Konolige’s translation per-
fectly aligns the weak extension semantics of default logic
with expansion semantics for autoepistemic logic, and like-
wise for extension and strong expansion semantics [De-
necker, Marek, and Truszczyn´ski, 2003].
Logic of universal causation The logic of universal cau-
sation is a nonmonotonic propositional modal logic with one
modality C [Turner, 1999]. A formula of this logic is trans-
lated to the pure logic of GK by replacing every occurrence
of C by K, adding A before each atom which is not in the
range ofC in it, and addingAp∨A¬p for each atom p. For
example, if a UCL formula is (p ∧ ¬q) ⊃ C(p ∧ ¬q) and
Atom = {p, q}, then the corresponding pure GK formula is
((Ap ∧ ¬Aq) ⊃ K(p ∧ ¬q))∧(Ap∨A¬p)∧(Aq∨A¬q).
Disjunctive logic programs A disjunctive LP rule
p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pk ← pk+1, . . . , pl, not pl+1, . . . , not pm,
where p’s are atoms, corresponds to the pure GK formula:
Kpk+1∧· · ·∧Kpl∧¬Apl+1∧· · ·∧¬Apm ⊃ Kp1∨· · ·∨Kpk
Main Result: From Pure GK to Disjunctive
ASP
Before presenting the translation, we introduce some nota-
tions. Let F be a pure GK formula, we use trp(F ) to denote
the propositional formula obtained from F by replacing each
occurrence of a K-atom Kφ by kφ and each occurrence of
anA-atomAψ by aψ , where kφ and aψ are new atoms with
respect to φ and ψ respectively. For a pure GK theory T , we
define trp(T ) =
∧
F∈T trp(F ). To illustrate these and the
definitions that follow, we use a running example.
Example 1 (Normal Reiter default) Consider the pure
GK theory {F} with F = ¬A¬p ⊃ Kp corresponding
to the default > : p/p, and another pure GK theory
{F,G} with G = K¬p corresponding to the de-
fault > : >/¬p. Then trp({F}) = ¬a¬p ⊃ kp and
trp({F,G}) = (¬a¬p ⊃ kp) ∧ k¬p, where a¬p, kp, and
k¬p are new atoms.
Here we introduce a set of new atoms kφ and aψ for each for-
mula φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and ψ ∈ AtomA(T ). Intuitively, the
new atom kφ (resp. aψ) will be used to encode containment
of the formula φ inK(M) (resp.A(M)) of a GK model M
for T .
Given a propositional formula φ and an atom a, we use
φa to denote the propositional formula obtained from φ by
replacing each occurrence of an atom p with a new atom pa
with respect to a. These formulas and new atoms will later
be used in our main translation to perform the minimality
check of the logic of GK’s semantics.
We now stepwise work our way towards the main result.
We start out with a result that relates a pure GK theory to
a propositional formula that will later reappear in our main
translation.
Proposition 1 Let T be a pure GK theory. A Kripke inter-
pretation M is a model of T if and only if there exists a
model I∗ of the propositional formula ΦT where
ΦT = trp(T ) ∧ Φsnd ∧ ΦKwit ∧ ΦAwit with
Φsnd =
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φk) ∧
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φa)
ΦKwit =
∧
ψ∈AtomK(T )
(¬kψ ⊃ ΦKψ )
ΦAwit =
∧
ψ∈AtomA(T )
(¬aψ ⊃ ΦAψ )
ΦKψ = ¬ψkψ ∧
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φkψ )
ΦAψ = ¬ψaψ ∧
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φaψ )
such that
• K(M)∩AtomK(T ) = {φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ), I∗ |= kφ};
• A(M)∩AtomA(T ) = {φ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ), I∗ |= aφ}.
The proposition examines the relationship between mod-
els of a pure GK theory and particular models of the proposi-
tional formula ΦT . The first conjunct trp(T ) of the formula
ΦT indicates that the k-atoms and a-atoms in it can be inter-
preted in accordance withK(M) andA(M) such that I∗ |=
trp(T ) iff M is a model of T . The soundness formula Φsnd
achieves that the sets {φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}
and {φ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and I∗ |= aφ} are consistent. The
witness formulas Φwit indicate that, if I∗ |= ¬kψ for some
ψ ∈ AtomK(T ) (resp. ψ ∈ AtomA(T )) then there exists a
model I ′ ofK(M) (resp.A(M)) such that I ′ |= ¬ψ, where
I ′ is explicitly indicated by newly introduced pkψ (resp. paψ )
atoms. So intuitively, if a formula is not known (or not as-
sumed), then there must be a witness for that. This condition
is necessary: for instance, the set {kp, kq,¬kp∧q} satisfies
the formula (kp∧q ⊃ kp) ∧ (kp∧q ⊃ kq), however, since
K(M) is a theory there does not exist a Kripke interpreta-
tionM such that p ∈ K(M), q ∈ K(M) and p∧q /∈ K(M).
Example 1 (Continued) Formula Φ{F} is given by:
trp({F}) = ¬a¬p ⊃ kp
Φsnd({F}) = (kp ⊃ pk) ∧ (a¬p ⊃ ¬pa)
ΦKwit({F}) = ¬kp ⊃ (¬pkp ∧ (kp ⊃ pkp))
ΦAwit({F}) = ¬a¬p ⊃ (¬¬pa¬p ∧ (a¬p ⊃ ¬pa¬p))
Formula Φ{F,G} is given by:
trp({F,G}) = (¬a¬p ⊃ kp) ∧ k¬p
Φsnd({F,G}) = Φsnd({F}) ∧ (k¬p ⊃ ¬pk)
ΦKwit({F,G}) = (¬kp ⊃ ΦKp ) ∧ (¬k¬p ⊃ ΦK¬p)
ΦAwit({F,G}) = ΦAwit({F})
ΦKp = ¬pkp ∧ (kp ⊃ pkp) ∧ (k¬p ⊃ ¬pkp)
ΦK¬p = ¬¬pk¬p ∧ (kp ⊃ pk¬p) ∧ (k¬p ⊃ ¬pk¬p)
where pk , pa , pkp , pa¬p , and pk¬p are new atoms. Note that
formula Φsnd({F,G}) prevents a model that satisfies both
kp and k¬p.
While Proposition 1 aligns Krikpe models and proposi-
tional models of the translation, there is yet no mention of
GK’s typical minimization step. This is the task of the next
result, which extends the above relationship to GK models.
Proposition 2 Let T be a pure GK theory. A Kripke inter-
pretation M is a GK model of T if and only if there exists a
model I∗ of the propositional formula ΦT such that
• K(M) = A(M) = Th ( {φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ), I∗ |= kφ} );
• for each ψ ∈ AtomA(T ),
I∗ |= aψ iff ψ ∈ Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ})
• there does not exist another model I∗′ such that
I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )},
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}.
Example 1 (Continued) Clearly the intended reading of
our running example {F} is that there is no reason to as-
sume that p is false, and the default lets us conclude that
we know p. This is testified by the partial interpretation
I∗ = {¬a¬p, kp, pk , pa¬p} (the remaining atoms are not rel-
evant). It is easy to see that I∗ is a model for Φ{F} and there
is no model I∗′ with the properties above. Now kp ∈ I∗
shows that p is known in the corresponding GK model.
Similarly, G provides a reason to assume that p is false
and {F,G} concludes that we know ¬p. Consider the par-
tial interpretation I∗ = {a¬p,¬kp, k¬p,¬pk ,¬pa ,¬pkp},
it specifies a model for Φ{F,G} and there is no model I∗′
with the properties above. In particular, k¬p ∈ I∗ shows
that ¬p is known in the corresponding GK model.
In Proposition 2, we only need to consider a Kripke inter-
pretation M such that A(M) ∪ K(M) is consistent. This
means that formula ΦT can be modified to ΨT where
ΨT = trp(T ) ∧Ψsnd ∧ΨKwit ∧ΨAwit with
Ψsnd =
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φ) ∧
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φ)
ΨKwit =
∧
ψ∈AtomK(T )
(
¬kψ ⊃ ΨKψ
)
ΨAwit =
∧
ψ∈AtomA(T )
(
¬aψ ⊃ ΨAψ
)
ΨKψ = ¬ψkψ ∧
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φkψ ) ∧
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φkψ )
ΨAψ = ¬ψaψ ∧
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φaψ ) ∧
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φaψ )
So the soundness formula Ψsnd actually becomes easier,
since soundness of knowledge and assumptions is enforced
for one and the same vocabulary (the one from the original
theory). The witness formulas become somewhat more com-
plicated, as the witnesses have to respect both the knowledge
as well as the assumptions of the theory. This is best ex-
plained by consulting our running example again.
Example 1 (Continued) While F ’s propositionalization
trp({F}) stays the same, the soundness and witness formu-
las change in the step from formula Φ{F} to formula Ψ{F}.
We only show the first conjunct of the witness formula Ψwit ,
which is given by
¬kp ⊃
(¬pkp ∧ (kp ⊃ pkp) ∧ (a¬p ⊃ ¬pkp))
Intuitively, the formula expresses that whenever p is not
known, then there must be a witness, that is, an interpre-
tation where p is false. Since the witnessing interpretations
could in principle be distinct for each K-atom, they have to
be indexed by the respectiveK-atom they refer to, as in pkp .
Of course, the witnesses have to obey all that is known and
assumed, which is guaranteed in the last two conjuncts.
Using this new formula, the result of Proposition 2 can be
restated.
Proposition 3 Let T be a pure GK theory. A Kripke inter-
pretation M is a GK model of T if and only if there exists a
model I∗ of the propositional formula ΨT such that
• K(M) = A(M) = Th ({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ), I∗ |= kφ});
• for each ψ ∈ AtomA(T ), we have that I∗ |= aψ implies
ψ ∈ Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ})
• there does not exist another model I∗′ of ΦT such that
I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}
We are now ready for our main result, translating a pure
GK theory to a disjunctive logic program. First, we intro-
duce some notations. Let T be a pure GK theory, we use
trne(T ) to denote the nested expression obtained from ΨT
by first converting it to negation normal form2, then replac-
ing “∧” by “,” and “∨” by “;”. A propositional formula φ
can be equivalently translated to conjunctive normal form
(involving at most linear blowup)
(p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pt ∨ ¬pt+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬pm) ∧ . . .
∧ (q1 ∨ · · · ∨ qk ∨ ¬qk+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬qn)
where p’s and q’s are atoms; we use tr c(φ) to denote the set
of rules
p1; . . . ; pt ← pt+1, . . . , pm . . . q1; . . . ; qk ← qk+1, . . . , qn
We use φ̂ to denote the propositional formula obtained from
φ by replacing each occurrence of an atom p by a new atom
pˆ.
2A propositional formula is in Negation Normal Form
(NNF) if negation occurs only immediately above atoms, and
{⊥,>,¬,∧,∨} are the only allowed connectives.
We use T ∗ to denote the propositional formula obtained
from the formula ΦT by replacing each occurrence of an
atom p (except atoms in {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}) by a new
atom p∗. Intuitively, each atom that is not an a-atom is re-
placed by a new atom.
Notice that trne(T ) is obtained from ΨT while T ∗ is ob-
tained from ΦT . Intuitively, by Proposition 3, trne(T ) is
used to restrict interpretations for introduced k-atoms and
a-atoms so that these interpretations serve as candidates for
GK models, and by Proposition 1, T ∗ constructs possible
models of the GK theory which are later used to test whether
these models prevent the candidate to be a GK model.
Inspired by the linear translation from parallel circum-
scription into disjunctive logic programs by Janhunen and
Oikarinen [2004], we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let T be a pure GK theory. A Kripke interpre-
tation M is a GK model of T if and only if there exists an
answer set S of the logic program tr lp(T ) in Figure 1 with
K(M) = A(M) = Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and kφ ∈ S}).
The intuition behind the construction is as follows:
• (1) and (2) in tr lp(T ): I∗ is a model of the formula ΨT .
• (3–8): if there exists a model I∗′ of the formula ΦT with
I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )},
then there exists a set S∗ constructed from new atoms
in tr c(T ∗) (which is a copy of the formula ΦT with
same aφ for each φ ∈ AtomA(T )) and cφ for some
φ ∈ AtomK(T ) such that S∗ satisfies rules (3) to (8) and
u /∈ S∗.
• (9) and (10): if there is such a set S∗ then it is the least set
containing u, all p∗’s and c-atoms.
• (11): such a set S∗ should not exist. (See item 3 in Propo-
sition 3.)
• (12) and (13): if there exists a model of the formula∧
φ∈AtomK(T )(kφ ⊃ φ̂)∧¬
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )(aφ ⊃ φ̂), then
v should not occur in the minimal model of the program.
• (14): ∧φ∈AtomK(T )(kφ ⊃ φ̂)∧¬∧φ∈AtomA(T )(aφ ⊃ φ̂)
should not be consistent. (This is necessary by item 2 in
Proposition 3.)
Given a model S of the logic program tr lp(T ), the new
atom u is used to indicate that the model I∗ of ΨT w.r.t. S
(specified by (1) and (2)) satisfies item 3 in Proposition 3.
Specifically, if I∗ does not satisfy item 3, then there exists a
subset S∗ of p∗’s and c-atoms that satisfies (3) to (8). If
in addition u /∈ S∗, then there exists a subset of S that
satisfies all rules in tr lp(T ) except (11), thus S cannot be
an answer set of tr lp(T ). Similarly, v is used to indicate
that I∗ satisfies item 2 in Proposition 3. Specifically, if
I∗ does not satisfy item 2, then the propositional formula∧
φ∈AtomK(T )(kφ ⊃ φ̂) ∧ ¬
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )(aφ ⊃ φ̂) is sat-
isfiable, thus there exists a subset Ŝ of pˆ’s that satisfies (12).
If in addition v /∈ Ŝ, then there exists a subset of S that sat-
isfies all rules in tr lp(T ) except (14), thus S cannot be an
answer set of tr lp(T ).
(1) ⊥ ← not trne(T )
(2) p′;¬p′ ← > (for each atom p′ occurring in trne(T ))
(3) u;A← B (for each rule A← B in tr c(T ∗))
(4) u; cφ1 ; · · · ; cφm ← > ({φ1, . . . , φm} = AtomK(T ))
(5) u← cφ, not kφ (for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ))
(6) u← k∗φ, not kφ (for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ))
(7) u← cφ, k∗φ, not¬kφ (for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ))
(8) u; cφ; k
∗
φ ← not¬kφ (for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ))
(9) p∗ ← u (for each new atom p∗ occurring in tr c(T ∗))
(10) cφ ← u (for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ))
(11) ⊥ ← not u
(12) v;A← B (for each rule A← B in
tr c
 ∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φ̂) ∧ ¬
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φ̂)
 )
(13) pˆ← v (for each atom pˆ except k-atoms and a-atoms occurring in
tr c
 ∧
φ∈AtomK(T )
(kφ ⊃ φ̂) ∧ ¬
∧
φ∈AtomA(T )
(aφ ⊃ φ̂)
 )
(14) ⊥ ← not v
Figure 1: Translation from pure GK theory T to disjunctive logic program tr lp(T ) used in Theorem 1, where u, v, and cφ (for
each φ ∈ AtomK(T )) are new atoms.
Example 1 (Continued) For our running example theory
{F} with F = ¬A¬p ⊃ Kp, we find that the logic program
translation tr lp({F}) has a single answer set S with kp ∈ S
Thus by Theorem 1 we can conclude that the GK theory {F}
has a single GK model M in which K(M) = Th({p}).
Likewise, the logic program tr lp({F,G}) has a single an-
swer set S′ with k¬p ∈ S′, whence {F,G} has a single GK
model M ′ in whichK(M ′) = Th({¬p}).
Computational complexity We have seen in the prelim-
inaries section that disjunctive logic programs can be mod-
ularly and equivalently translated into pure formulas of the
logic of GK. Conversely, Theorem 1 shows that pure GK
formulas can be equivalently translated into disjunctive logic
programs. Eiter and Gottlob showed that the problem of de-
ciding whether a disjunctive logic program has an answer set
is ΣP2 -complete [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995]. In combination,
these results yield the following straightforward complexity
result for the satisfiability of pure GK.
Proposition 4 Let T be a pure GK theory. The problem of
deciding whether T has a GK model is ΣP2 -complete.
We remark that the hardness of disjunctive logic programs
stems from so-called head cycles (at least two atoms that
mutually depend on each other and occur jointly in some
rule head). It is straightforwardly checked that our encoding
creates such head cycles, for example the head of rule (8)
contains the cycle induced by rules (7) and (10).
Implementation
We have implemented the translation of Theorem 1 into a
working prototype gk2dlp. The program is written in Pro-
log and uses the disjunctive ASP solver claspD-2 [Gebser,
Kaufmann, and Schaub, 2013], which was ranked first place
in the 2013 ASP competition.3
Our prototype is the first implementation of the (pure)
logic of GK to date. The restriction to pure formulas seems
harmless since all known applications of the logic of GK
use only pure formulas. We remark that gk2dlp implements
default and autoepistemic logics such that input and target
language are of the same complexity.
Evaluation To have a scalable problem domain and in-
spired by dl2asp [Chen et al., 2010], we chose the fair di-
vision problem [Bouveret and Lang, 2008] for experimental
evaluation. An instance of the fair division problem consists
of a set of agents, a set of goods, and for each agent a set
of constraints that intuitively express which sets of goods
the agent is willing to accept. A solution is then an assign-
ment of goods to agents that is a partition of all goods and
satisfies all agents’ constraints. Bouveret and Lang [2008]
showed that the problem is ΣP2 -complete, and can be natu-
rally encoded in default logic.
3http://www.mat.unical.it/ianni/storage/
aspcomp-2013-lpnmrtalk.pdf
We created random instances of the fair division prob-
lem with increasing numbers of agents and goods. We then
applied the translation of [Bouveret and Lang, 2008], fur-
thermore the translation from default logic into the logic of
GK, then invoked gk2dlp to produce logic programs and fi-
nally used gringo 3.0.3 and claspD version 2 (revision 6814)
to compute all answer sets of these programs, thus all ex-
tensions of the original default theory corresponding to all
solutions of the problem instance. The experiments were
conducted on a Lenovo laptop with an Intel Core i3 proces-
sor with 4 cores and 4GB of RAM running Ubuntu 12.04.
We recorded the size of the default theory, the size of the
translated logic program, the translation time and the solv-
ing time, as well as the number of solutions obtained. We
started out with 2 agents and 2 goods, and stepwise in-
creased these numbers towards 6. For each combination
in (a, g) ∈ {2, . . . , 6} × {2, . . . , 6}, we tested 20 randomly
generated instances. Random generation here means that
we create agents’ preferences by iteratively drawing random
subsets of goods to add to an agent’s acceptable subsets with
probability P , where P is initialized with 1 and discounted
by the factor g−1g for each subset that has been drawn.
In accordance with our theoretical predictions, we ob-
served that the increase in size from GK formula to logic
program is indeed polynomial (albeit with a low exponent).
The plot on the right (Figure 2) shows the solving time in
relation to the size of the default theory, where the time
axis is logarithmic. We can see that the runtime behavior
of gk2dlp is satisfactory. We acknowledge however that
the runtimes we measured are not competitive with those
reported by Chen et al. [2010] for dl2asp. However, a direct
comparison of the two systems is problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. First of all, the system dl2asp is not pub-
licly available to the best of our knowledge. Furthermore,
Chen et al. [2010] do not describe how they create random
instances of the fair division problem, so we cannot compare
the runtimes they report and the ones we measured. Finally,
dl2asp is especially engineered for default logic, and it is
not clear how their approach can be generalized to other lan-
guages, for example Turner’s logic of universal causation. In
general, the approaches to translation that are followed by
dl2asp and gk2dlp are completely different: dl2asp trans-
lates a ΣP2 -complete problem to an NP-complete problem
using a translation in ∆P2 . Our system gk2dlp translates
a ΣP2 -complete problem into another Σ
P
2 -complete problem
using a translation that can be computed in polynomial time.
Applications We see immediate applicability of the trans-
lation of the present paper to several areas. Reiter [1987]
provided a theory of diagnosis from first principles, and
showed how default logic can be used as an implementation
device. Cadoli, Eiter, and Gottlob [1994] proposed to use
default logic as an expressive query language on top of rela-
tional databases, and gave an example of achieving strate-
gic behavior in an economic setting. In reasoning about
actions, Thielscher [1996] used default logic to solve the
qualification problem of dealing with unexpected action fail-
ures. Martin and Thielscher [2001] later provided an imple-
mentation of that approach where extensions are enumer-
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Figure 2: Solving time (log scale) with respect to default
theory size.
ated in Prolog. Recently, Baumann et al. [2010] introduced
a method for default reasoning in action theories, that is, an
approach to the question what normally holds in a dynamic
domain. Our translation yields an implementation of their
approach, something that they stated as future work and later
achieved to a limited extent (for a restricted sublanguage of
their framework [Strass, 2012]). In a similar vein, Pagnucco
et al. [2013] looked at belief change in the situation calculus
and proposed an implementation based on default logic with
preferences [Brewka, 1994; Delgrande and Schaub, 2000].
Related work The translation presented in this paper is
a generalization of the one presented for Turner’s logic of
universal causation by Ji and Lin [2013]. We chose the
logic of GK as general nonmonotonic language, we could
also have chosen the logic of minimal belief and negation as
failure [Lifschitz, 1994], the logic of here-and-there [Heyt-
ing, 1930] or the nonmonotonic modal logic S4F [Schwarz
and Truszczynski, 1994]. In terms of implementations, there
are few approaches that treat as broad a range of propo-
sitional nonmonotonic knowledge representation languages
as gk2dlp. Notable exceptions are the works of Junker
and Konolige [1990], who implemented both autoepistemic
and default logics by translating them to truth maintenance
systems; Niemela¨ [1995], who provides a decision proce-
dure for autoepistemic logic which also incorporates exten-
sion semantics for default logics; and Rosati [1999], who
provides algorithms for Lifschitz’ logic of minimal belief
and negation as failure [1994]. Other approaches are re-
stricted to specific languages, where default logic seems to
be most popular. The recent system dl2asp [Chen et al.,
2010] translates default theories to normal (non-disjunctive)
logic programs; the translation figures out all implication
relations between formulas occurring in the default theory,
just as Junker and Konolige [1990] did. The authors of
dl2asp [Chen et al., 2010] already observed that default logic
and disjunctive logic programs are of the same complex-
ity; they even stated the search for a polynomial translation
from the former to the latter (that we achieved in this pa-
per) as future work. Gadel [Nicolas, Saubion, and Ste´phan,
2000] uses a genetic algorithm to compute extensions of
a default theory; likewise the system DeReS [Cholewin´ski
et al., 1999] is not translation-based but directly searches
for extensions; similarly the XRay system [Schaub and
Nicolas, 1997] implements local query-answering in default
logics. Risch and Schwind [1994] describe a tableaux-
based algorithm for computing all extensions of general de-
fault theories, but do not report runtimes for their Prolog-
based implementation. For autoepistemic logic, Marek and
Truszczyn´ski [1991] investigate sceptical reasoning with re-
spect to Moore’s expansion semantics.
Discussion
We have presented the first translation of pure formulas of
the logic of GK to disjunctive answer set programming.
Among other things, this directly leads to implementations
of Turner’s logic of universal causation as well as implemen-
tations of default and autoepistemic logics under different
semantics. We have prototypically implemented the transla-
tion and experimentally analysed its performance, which we
found to be satisfactory given the system’s generality.
In the future, we plan to integrate further nonmonotonic
reasoning formalisms. This is more or less straightforward
due to the generality of this work: to implement a language,
it suffices to provide a translation into pure formulas of GK,
then Theorem 1 of this paper does the rest. Particular for-
malism we want to look at are default logics with prefer-
ences [Brewka, 1994; Delgrande and Schaub, 2000] and the
logic of only-knowing [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2005]. It
also seems worthwhile to check whether our translation can
be adapted to the nonmonotonic modal logic S4F [Schwarz
and Truszczynski, 1994; Truszczyn´ski, 2007], that has only
one modality instead of two. We finally plan to study the
approaches mentioned as applications in the previous sec-
tion to try out our translation and implementation on agent-
oriented AI problems.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
⇒: Let M be a model of T , I1 ⊆ Lit a model ofK(M),
and I2 ⊆ Lit a model of A(M). Clearly, for each φ ∈
AtomK(T ), if φ ∈ K(M) then I1 |= φ; if φ /∈ K(M) then
there exists a model I ′ of K(M) such that I ′ |= ¬φ. Same
results are established for each φ ∈ AtomA(T ).
Then, we can create an interpretation I∗ such that
I∗ = {lk | l ∈ I1} ∪ {la | l ∈ I2}
∪ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) ∩K(M)}
∪ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) ∩A(M)}
∪ {¬kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and φ /∈ K(M)}
∪ {¬aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and φ /∈ A(M)}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
ψ∈K(M)
{lkψ | l ∈ I1} ∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
ψ∈A(M)
{laψ | l ∈ I2}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
ψ/∈K(M)
{
lkψ | l ∈ I ′, I ′ is a model ofK(M) ∪ {¬ψ}}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
ψ/∈A(M)
{laψ | l ∈ I ′, I ′ is a model ofA(M) ∪ {¬ψ}} .
It is easy to verify that I∗ is a model of ΦT and
• K(M)∩AtomK(T ) = {φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ), I∗ |= kφ};
• A(M)∩AtomA(T ) = {φ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ), I∗ |= aφ}.
⇐: Let I∗ be a model of ΦT . We can create a Kripke
interpretation M such that
• K(M) = Th ( {φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ} );
• A(M) = Th ( {φ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and I∗ |= aφ} ).
Note that, {l ∈ Lit | I∗ |= lk} is a model of K(M) and
{l ∈ Lit | I∗ |= la} is a model of A(M), then both K(M)
andA(M) are consistent.
For each φ ∈ AtomK(T ), if I∗ |= kφ then
φ ∈ K(M); if I∗ |= ¬kφ then there exists a model
I ′ = {l ∈ Lit | I∗ |= lkφ} such that I ′ is a model ofK(M)
and I ′ |= ¬φ, thus φ /∈ K(M). So I∗ |= kφ iff φ ∈ K(M).
The same result is established for each φ ∈ AtomA(T ).
Note that, I∗ |= trp(T ) then M is a model of T .
Proof of Proposition 2:
⇒: LetM be a GK model of T . From the proof of Propo-
sition 1, we can create a model I∗ of ΦT . Now we want to
prove that I∗ satisfies all conditions in the proposition.
From Theorem 3.5 in [Lin and Shoham, 1992],K(M) =
Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) ∩ K(M)}), then K(M) =
A(M) = Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}).
Assume that there exists another model I∗′ of ΦT with
I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}
Then, from Proposition 1, there exists a Kripke inter-
pretation M ′ such that K(M ′) = Th({φ | φ ∈
AtomK(T ) and I∗′ |= kφ}),A(M ′) = A(M), and M ′ is a
model of T . Note that, for each φ ∈ AtomK(T ), I∗′ |= ¬kφ
impliesK(M ′) 6|= φ, thenK(M ′) ( K(M). From the def-
inition of GK models, there does not exist such a model M ′,
which conflicts to the assumption, then there does not exist
such a model I∗′.
From the construction of I∗, for each ψ ∈ AtomA(T ),
I∗ |= aψ iff ψ ∈ A(M). Note that, K(M) = A(M) =
Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}), then I∗ |= aψ iff
ψ ∈ Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}).
So I∗ is a model of ΦT which satisfies all conditions in
the proposition.
⇐: Let I∗ be a model of ΦT which satisfies correspond-
ing conditions in the proposition. We can create a Kripke
interpretation M such thatK(M) = A(M) = Th({φ | φ ∈
AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}).
From the third condition in the proposition, I∗ |= aφ
iff φ ∈ K(M) for each φ ∈ AtomA(T ). Then A(M) ∩
AtomA(T ) = {φ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and I∗ |= aφ}. From
the proof of Proposition 1, M is a model of T and I∗ |= kφ
(resp. I∗ |= aφ) iff φ ∈ K(M) for each φ ∈ AtomK(T )
(resp. φ ∈ AtomA(T )). Now we want to prove that M is a
GK model of T .
Assume that there exists another model M ′ of T such
that A(M ′) = A(M) and K(M ′) ( K(M). Note that
K(M) = Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}), then
K(M ′) ∩AtomK(T ) ( K(M) ∩AtomK(T ).
Let I = I∗ ∩ {lk | l ∈ Lit}, clearly, I is a model
of K(M), A(M), and K(M ′). We can construct another
model I∗′ of ΦT as
I∗′ = {lk | l ∈ I} ∪ {la | l ∈ I}
∪ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) ∩K(M ′)}
∪ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) ∩A(M)}
∪ {¬kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and φ /∈ K(M ′)}
∪ {¬aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and φ /∈ A(M)}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
ψ∈K(M′)
{lkψ | l ∈ I} ∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
ψ∈A(M)
{laψ | l ∈ I}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
ψ/∈K(M′)
{
lkψ | l ∈ I ′, I ′ is a model ofK(M ′) ∪ {¬ψ}}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
ψ/∈A(M)
{laψ | l ∈ I ′, I ′ is a model ofA(M) ∪ {¬ψ}} .
From the proof of Proposition 1, I∗′ is a model of ΦT , and
I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}
This conflicts to the second condition in the proposition,
then the assumption is not valid. So there does not exist
another model M ′ of T such that A(M ′) = A(M) and
K(M ′) ( K(M), thus M is a GK model of T .
Proof of Theorem 1:
⇒: Let M be a GK model of T . From Proposition 3,
there exists a model I∗ of ΨT such thatK(M) = A(M) =
Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}). We can create a
set S of literals as S = I∗ ∪ {u, v} ∪
{p∗ | for each new atom p∗ occurring in tr c(T ∗)} ∪
{cφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ∪ {pˆ | p ∈ Atom}.
Clearly, S satisfies each rule in tr lp(T ). Now we want to
prove that S is an answer set of the program.
Assume that S is not an answer set of tr lp(T ), then there
exists another set S′ ( S such that S′ satisfies each rule
in the reduct tr lp(T )S . Note that, I∗ ⊆ S′, u implies
{p∗ | for each new atom p∗ occurring in tr c(T ∗)} ∪ {cφ |
φ ∈ AtomK(T )} and v implies {pˆ | p ∈ Atom}. Then
there are only two possible cases: u /∈ S′ or v /∈ S′.
Case 1: u /∈ S′, then there exists a set
T = S′ ∩ ({p∗ | p∗ is a new atom occurring in tr c(T ∗)}
∪ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
)
such that T satisfies tr c(T ∗). For each φ ∈ AtomK(T ),
• by the rule u← cφ, not kφ, I∗ |= ¬kφ implies cφ /∈ S′;
• by the rule u← k∗φ, not kφ, I∗ |= ¬kφ implies k∗φ /∈ S′;
• by rules u ← cφ, k∗φ, not¬kφ and u; cφ; k∗φ ← not¬kφ,
I∗ |= kφ implies either cφ or k∗φ is in S′ but not both;
• by the rule u; cφ1 ; · · · ; cφm ← >, there exists cψ ∈ S′ for
some ψ ∈ AtomK(T ).
So there exists ψ ∈ AtomK(T ) such that kψ ∈ S′, cψ ∈ S′
and k∗ψ /∈ S′. Then we could create an interpretation I∗′ as
I∗′ = {p | p ∈ Atom and p∗ ∈ S′}
∪ {¬p | p ∈ Atom and p∗ /∈ S′}
∪ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and k∗φ ∈ S′}
∪ {¬kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and k∗φ /∈ S′}
∪ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and aφ ∈ S′}
∪ {¬aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T ) and aφ /∈ S′}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
{pkψ | pkψ∗ ∈ S′}∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomK(T )
{¬pkψ | pkψ∗ /∈ S′}
∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
{paψ | paψ∗ ∈ S′}∪
⋃
ψ∈AtomA(T )
{¬paψ | paψ∗ /∈ S′}.
Clearly, I∗′ is a model of ΨT . From the above results,
• I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈
AtomA(T )}, and
• I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈
AtomK(T )}.
From Proposition 3, such I∗′ does not exist. This conflicts
to the assumption, then Case 1 is impossible.
Case 2: v /∈ S′, then there exists a set
U = S′ ∩ ({aˆ | a ∈ Atom} ∪ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}
∪ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
)
such that U satisfies each rule in
tr c(
∧
φ∈AtomK(T )(kφ ⊃ φ̂) ∧ ¬
∧
ψ∈AtomA(T )(aψ ⊃ ψ̂)).
Then there exists ψ ∈ AtomA(T ) such that I∗ |= aψ
and there exists an interpretation I ⊆ Lit such that I |=∧
φ∈AtomK(T ),I∗|=kφ φ ∧ ¬ψ, thus ψ /∈ Th({φ | φ ∈
AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}). From Proposition 3, such ψ
does not exist. This conflicts to the assumption, then Case
2 is impossible. So both cases are impossible, then S′ does
not exist and S is an answer set of tr lp(T ).
⇐: Let S be an answer set of tr lp(T ). We can create
an interpretation I∗ as the intersection of S with the set of
atoms occurring in ΨT . Clearly, I∗ is a model of ΨT .
Similar to the above proof: If there exists another model
I∗′ of ΨT such that
I∗′ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )} = I∗ ∩ {aφ | φ ∈ AtomA(T )}
I∗′ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )} ( I∗ ∩ {kφ | φ ∈ AtomK(T )}
then there exists another set S′ such that S′ satisfies each
rule in the reduct tr lp(T )S and u /∈ S′, thus S′ ( S. This
conflicts to the precondition that S is an answer set, then
such a model I∗′ does not exist.
If there exists ψ ∈ AtomA(T ) such that I∗ |= aψ and
ψ /∈ Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and I∗ |= kφ}), then there
exists another set S′ such that S′ satisfies each rule in the
reduct tr lp(T )S and v /∈ S′, thus S′ ( S. This conflicts to
the precondition that S is an answer set, then such ψ does
not exist.
From Proposition 3, a Kripke interpretation M such that
K(M) = A(M) = Th({φ | φ ∈ AtomK(T ) and kφ ∈ S})
is a GK models of T .
